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THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S ATTEMPT TO
DEFINE COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR
COMPUTER SOFTWARE: IS THE
ABSTRACTION-FILTRATION-
COMPARISON TEST A WORKABLE
SOLUTION?
The tremendous growth in the personal computer industry
during the past decade1 has spurred rapid development in the
software market.2 Once a highly technical and expensive product
available only to commercial users, software 3 may now be pur-
chased by individuals at a reasonable price.4 However, because
1. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 761 (1991) [hereinafter STATISTI-
CAL ABsTRAcT]. In 1981, 1.1 million personal computers were purchased at a cost of $3.1
billion as contrasted with 6.75 million units sold in 1985 for $17.1 billion. Id. By 1988, sales
reached 9.5 million totalling $27.7 billion in revenues. Id. Moreover, an estimated 23% of
the households in the United States owned personal computers in 1989, as compared to 13%
percent in 1985. See Trish Hall, Electronics: It's Not Home Without It, N.Y. TIaMs, Mar.
29, 1990, at C6.
2. See Howard Root, Note,.Copyright Infringement of Computer Programs: A Modifi-
cation of the Substantial Similarity Test, 68 MINN. L. REV. 1264, 1264 (1984). During the
past forty years, microcomputers and mass-marketed software have grown and evolved with
"phenomenal speed." Id. "An estimated one million computer programs are created each
year." Id. at n.2 (citation omitted). This results from the fact that "[t]he world is undergo-
ing an information explosion that is causing a demand for new products and services to help
manage vast amounts of information efficiently and effectively." Victor Siber, The World-
wide Status of Software Protection, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 21, 1985, at 20.
3. See DAvID BENDER, COMPUTER LAW: EVIDENCE & PROCEDURE § 2.06 (1990). Com-
puter experts and the courts have not defined the terms "software" and "computer pro-
gram" in any uniform manner. Id. Conceptually, the two words are the same, but computer
programs have been distinguished as being "sets of instructions that operate the computer,"
R. LEE HAGELsHAW, Tan COMPUTER USER's LEGAL GUIDE 87 (1985), while computer software
"is the collection of the materials that contains, expresses and explains a computer pro-
gram," id. at 87. The copyright statute defines a computer program as a "set of statements
or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a
certain result." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). In this paper, the terms "software" and "computer
program" will be used interchangeably, and the definition of these terms will be limited to
the set of materials that instructs the computer. See BENDER, supra, § 2.06 (defining
software as computer programs).
4. See Thomas L. Hazen, Contract Principles as a Guide for Protecting Intellectual
Property Rights on Computer Software: The Limits of Copyright Protection, The Evolving
Concept of Derivative Works, and the Proper Limits of Licensing Arrangements, 20 U.C.
DAvis L. REV. 105, 105-06 (1986). The consumer-oriented software market has evolved into a
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software is relatively easy to copy5 and computer literacy is on the
rise,6 protection against unauthorized copying7 has become a pri-
mary concern of computer software companies. Unfortunately, the
law has increasingly been outpaced by the technology in the com-
puter software field.' Thus, it is often unclear what protection, if
any, is afforded to a particular computer program.9 Copyright re-
major industry. Id. at 106. For example, in 1989, magazine advertising for computers, sta-
tionery and office equipment totalled $288 million as contrasted with only $78 million in
1980. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 1, at 563.
5. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 775, 783 (C.D. Cal.
1983), af'd, 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984). "[T]he process of duplicating or copying a pro-
gram, once it is put into usable form . . .is almost absurdly simple." Id. In addition,
"[d]iskettes can be copied for a minimal cost by anyone with rudimentary technical skill."
Id.; see also Root, supra note 2, at 1264 ("pirating" of software is easy and prevalent); Mark
M. Friedman, Copyrighting Machine Language Computer Software-The Case Against, 9
CoMPuTE/L.J. 1, 2 (1989) ("pirating" software has reached epidemic proportions and ad-
versely affects industry).
6. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 1, at 150. In 1989, 96% of elementary and
secondary level institutions used computers in the curriculum. Id. Computer use in the busi-
ness environment was over 38% in 1989. Id. at 412.
7. See Charles Cangialosi, The Electronic Underground: Computer Piracy and Elec-
tronic Bulletin Boards, 15 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 265, 271-73 (1989). It is esti-
mated that in 1988 over $1 billion in revenue was lost world-wide because of unauthorized
copying. Id. Due to the increased losses in sales and corresponding loss of production and
jobs resulting from the theft of computer software, unauthorized copying must be con-
fronted not only to remedy the immediate injury, but for the long term deterrence. Id. at
300-01. In addition, because the actual writing of the software code is relatively easy com-
pared to the amount of work, expense and effort that goes into a program's logic, structure,
and maintenance, software deserves protection from piracy. See Friedman, supra note 5, at
16. In fact, only 20% of the program's cost is attributable to the coding itself. See Whelan
Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1231 (3rd Cir. 1986) (citation omit-
ted), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
8. See Root, supra note 2, at 1268-69 ("copyright laws have only recently been inter-
preted to extend to computer software"). "Congress, as well as the judiciary, is hard pressed
to keep current on computer developments." Id. at 1269 n.34.
In 1975, Congress created the National Commission on New Technology Uses of Copy-
righted Works ("CONTU") to study the problems associated with intellectual property. See
FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED
WORKS 1 (1979) [hereinafter CONTU REPORT]. Prior to receiving CONTU's recommenda-
tions, Congress passed the Copyright Act of 1976, which classifies computer programs as
"literary works." See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 107 (1988). In 1978, CONTU issued its report con-
taining a number of recommendations. See CONTU REPORT, supra, at 1-3. One recommen-
dation was to make clear that computer programs, "to the extent that they embody an
author's original creation, are proper subject matter of copyright." Id. at 2. Congress
adopted the recommendations in 1980, and explicitly extended copyright protection to com-
puter software. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 107 (1988). For additional information on copyright
protection of software, see infra notes 47-95 and accompanying text.
9. See MICHAEL C. GEMIGNANI, THE LAW AND THE COMPUTER 80 (1981). Patent law,
trade secrecy, and copyright have all been used to protect ideas from copying without per-
mission; however, the evolution of computer technology has presented legal problems that
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strictions are Vague, and there remains a great deal of confusion as
have not previously been encountered. Id. See generally BENDER, supra note 3, § 3 (discuss-
ing methods available to protect software).
Although copyright protection for computer software has been available since 1964,
only 1205 programs were submitted for copyrighted registration between 1964 and 1978, and
over three quarters of the software registered were owned by two of the largest hardware
manufacturers, IBM and Burroughs Corp. See Mickey T. Mihm, Note, Software Piracy and
the Personal Computer: Is the 1980 Software Copyright Act Effective?, 4 COMPUTER/L.J.
171, 180 (1983); GEAUGNANI, supra, at 86 (noting little interest in copyright of software). The
reason for such a low rate of registration was the uncertainty over whether copyright laws
would protect a program's underlying ideas and methods. See Raymond J. Areaux, Com-
ment, Computer Software Protection: From Infancy to Adolescence, 31 Loy. L. REV. 301,
310-11 (1985).
While copyright protection for programs is relatively inexpensive and easy to obtain, "it
is patent protection for which the software industry has lobbied most actively." See
GEMIGNANI, supra, at 93. Patent protection is available for "any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof." 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). It only protects creations that are not obvious. See Graham
v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 3 (1966). If one product accomplishes substantially the same
result as a patented product, in the same manner, then the patent has been infringed, re-
gardless of any difference in form, shape or name. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air
Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950) (citing Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S.
30, 42 (1929)). The Supreme Court has withheld patent protection from certain scientific
areas, such as laws of nature, see Eibel Process Co. v. Minnesota & Ontario Paper Co., 261
U.S. 45, 52 (1923) (refusing to grant patent protection to principle that water will run down-
hill), and mathematical expressions, see MacKay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am.,
306 U.S. 86, 94-102 (1938) (improving empirical mathematical formula not patentable
invention).
The Patent and Trademark Office initially took the view that patent protection was not
available for computer programs because they encompassed mathematical processes or ex-
pressions. See Nelson Moskowitz, The Metamorphosis of Software-Related Invention
Patentability, 3 COMPUTER/L.J. 273, 282-83 (1982). CONTU, which was created by Congress
to study the implications of the new technologies in intellectual property law, had serious
doubts "whether a patent may ever be obtained for a computer program." See CONTU
REoRT, supra note 8, at 42.
The Supreme Court, however, has clearly indicated that patent protection is available
for computer programs. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981) (subject matter not
precluded from patent protection merely because it implements a "mathematical formula,
computer program, or digital computer"). Although patent law confers broad protection, it
is not considered flawless. See GEMIGNANI, supra, at 100. It is a "questionable means of
protecting software" because it is expensive, time consuming to litigate, and difficult to
prove non-obviousness." Andrew G. Rodau, Protecting Computer Software: After Apple
Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), Does Copyright
Provide the Best Protection?, 57 TEMP. L.Q. 527, 551-52 (1984).
Moreover, the restrictions on patent applications make it difficult for a software pack-
age to secure patent protection. See GEMIGNANI, supra, at 99-101. However, while an ab-
stract idea or principle is not patentable, a process or device that uses it may be within the
ambit of patent protection. "If a court determines that a program is identical with the al-
gorithm it contains, then the court will necessarily hold against patentability." Id. at 101.
Alternatively, if the program is simply "a useful process that utilizes the algorithm without
preempting it, and the program clears the hurdles of novelty and unobviousness as well, the
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to which elements are unprotectable as "ideas" and which ele-
ments are protectable as "expressions."1
This Note will examine the "idea-expression" dichotomy of
copyright law as it pertains to computer software. Part One will
discuss the historical development of software copyright law apply-
ing copyright infringement standards to computer software. Part
Two will outline the steps involved in the development of a com-
puter program. Part Three will discuss how the "idea-expression"
distinction has developed through case law and the difficulty en-
countered by the judiciary in the software field. Part Four will pre-
sent the Second Circuit's most recent attempt to enunciate a new
standard in this area and will discuss the limitations of this stan-
court will find it patentable." Id.
Trade secrecy and contract law are the industry's most widely used methods of protec-
tion. See Friedman, supra note 5, at 32; RAYMOND T. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COMPUTER TECH-
NOLOGY T 3.01, at 3-2 (1985). Trade secretes do not require registration and protection is
immediately available for a program's logic and design including techniques, methods,
processes, as well as the actual "source code" and "object code." See Friedman, supra, note
5, at 32; Anderson L. Baldy III, Note, Computer Copyright: An Emerging Form of Protec-
tion for Object Code Software After Apple v. Franklin, 5 COMPUTER/L.J. 233, 240 (1984).
The legally protected interest in software is defined in the Restatement (First) of Torts:
[A trade secret consists of] information which is used in one's business and which
gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not
know or use it .... A substantial element of secrecy must exist, so that, by use of
improper means, there would be difficulties in acquiring information .... Protec-
tion is not based on a policy of rewarding or otherwise encouraging the develop-
ment of secret processes or devices. The protection is merely against breach of
faith and reprehensible means of learning another's secret.
NIMMER, supra, % 3.02, at 3-3 (quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRsT) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939))
(brackets in original). In order for one to possess a protected trade secret, there must be
expectations of secrecy between the creator and the potential misappropriator of novel and
valuable information. Id. at 3-4. This requirement leads to several problems inherent in
trade secret protection, particularly for mass-marketed software. See Peter S. Menell, An
Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for Application Programs, 41 STAN. L. REv.
1046, 1077-78 (1989) (discussing difficulties in establishing and enforcing trade secret pro-
tection programs). For example, there are no judicially enforceable confidentiality restraints
between the parties. See NIMMER, supra, 3.01, at 3-2. In addition, since trade secrete pro-
tection is created by state law, it varies from state to state; thus, the level of protection also
differs from one locale to the next. See Friedman, supra note 5, at 32; GEMIGNANI, supra, at
113.
10. See Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1235 (3rd Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987). The distinction between "idea" and "expression"
is elusive, and it will inevitably be decided on an ad hoc basis. Id. Judge Learned Hand
stated that "[n]obody has ever been able to fix that boundary, and nobody ever can." Nich-
ols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902
(1931). Unfortunately, the CONTU report and the 1980 amendments to the Copyright Act
did not explicitly state which elements of a program were protected and which were not. See
Friedman, supra note 5, at 6-7.
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dard. Finally, Part V will offer an alternative approach to provide
copyright protection for computer software in light of existing pol-
icy considerations and the economic nature of the software
industry.
I. SOFTWARE COPYRIGHT LAW
United States copyright law is founded on the constitutional
power granted to Congress to "promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts."'" Congress exercised this power by enacting the
Copyright Act of 1976,12 which declares that "copyright protection
subsists ... in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible
medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which
they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, ei-
ther directly or with the aid of a machine or device.' 3 Congress
initially intended to afford copyright protection to computer pro-
grams. 4 This intention was reaffirmed and clarified by the 1980
amendments to the Copyright Act,' which classify computer pro-
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
12. Act of October 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 99 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-108); see Friedman, supra note 5, at 5. The first copyright law
was enacted in 1790, but the last thorough revision was passed in 1976. Id. (citation omit-
ted); M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 432 (4th Cir. 1986) (discussing develop-
ment of copyright law).
"In attempting to fulfill its constitutional mandate... Congress has created a balance
between the artist's right to control the work during the term of the copyright protection
and the public's need for access to creative works." Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 209
(1990). The task of defining the scope of copyright protection under the Constitution re-
quires Congress to balance "the interests of the authors and inventors in the control and
exploitation of their writings and discoveries on the one hand, and society's competing inter-
est in the free flow of ideas, information and commerce on the other hand." Sony Corp. of
Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
13. 17 U.S.C § 102(a) (1988).
14. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5664. The House Report issued with the 1976 Copyright Act stated:
The history of copyright law has been one of gradual expansion in the types
of works accorded protection .... In some of these cases the new expressive
forms-electronic music, filmstrips, and computer programs, for example-could
be regarded as an extension of copyrightable subject matter Congress had already
intended to protect, and were thus considered copyrightable from the outset with-
out the need of new legislation.
Id.
15. See Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028 (codified at 17
U.S.C. §§ 101, 117 (1988)) [hereinafter Act of Dec. 12, 1980]. CONTU's charter provided for
a three year review period commencing in 1975. See CONTU REPORT, supra note 8, at 1.
Thus, its recommendations were not compiled until after the enactment of the Copyright
Act of 1976. Id.
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grams as protectable "literary works."'
Copyright protection is only available for a work's "expres-
sion,"-not its "idea.' 1 7 Although this "idea-expression" dichot-
omy has long been recognized by the courts," determining the ex-
CONTU made a number of suggestions in the area of computer software:
The new copyright law should be amended 1) to make it explicit that computer
programs, to the extent that they embody an author's original creation, are proper
subject matter of copyright; 2) to apply to all computer uses of copyrighted pro-
grams by the deletion of the present Section 117; and 3) to assure that rightful
possessors of copies of computer programs can use or adapt these copies for their
own use.
Id. at 2. The recommendations were intended to achieve the following goals:
(1) Copyright should proscribe the unauthorized copying of these works.
(2) Copyright should in no way inhibit the rightful use of these works.
(3) Copyright should not block the development and dissemination of these
works.
(4) Copyright should not grant anyone more economic power than is necessary to
achieve the incentive to create.
Id. at 29. The recommendations, however, were not unanimously supported by all members
of CONTU itself. Id. at 2. Commissioner Hersey dissented, arguing that "copyright protec-
tion does not extend to a computer program in the form in which it is capable of being used
to control computer operations." Id. The recommendations of CONTU were nevertheless
adopted by Congress in the 1980 amendments to the Copyright Act. See Act of Dec. 12,
1980, supra, at 3028.
16. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). "'Literary works' are works other than audiovisual
work, expressed in words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia, regard-
less of the nature of the material objects .... film, tapes, disks, or cards, in which they are
embodied." Id. '[L]iterary works' include "computer programs to the extent that they incor-
porate authorship in the programmer's expression of original ideas ... [not] the ideas them-
selves." H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 14, at 54, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5667.
The 'literary works' classification is "one of seven copyrightable categories." See Apple
Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1249 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dis-
missed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984). "[A] computer program, whether in object code or source
code, is a 'literary work' and is protected from unauthorized copying." Id.; see also 1 MEL-
VILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.04(c), at 2-46.2 to 2-46.3
(1991) (written computer programs are copyrightable as literary works). Additionally, case
law has held that computer programs are copyrightable, under a separate category, as "origi-
nal works of authorship in any tangible medium of expression." Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic
Int'l, Inc. 685 F.2d 870, 873 (3d Cir. 1982) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1976)).
17. See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. (11 Otto) 99, 103-04 (1879). "Idea" has been defined,
inter alia, as "[alny conception existing in the mind as a result of mental understanding,
awareness, or activity; ... a thought, conception, or notion; ... an impression." THE RAN-
DOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 949 (2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter RANDOM
HOUSE DICTIONARY]. 'Expression' refers to the physical embodiment ideas." Roth Greeting
Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1109 (9th Cir. 1970); see also Whelan Assocs., Inc.
v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1234 (3d Cir. 1986) (only "expressions of ideas"
protected), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987); Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 775
F. Supp. 544, 558 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (same), aff'd 1992 WL 372273 (2d Cir. 1992). See gener-
ally 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 16, at § 2.03[D] (only expression protected).
18. See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954) (discussing idea-expression "di-
chotomy"); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. (11 Otto) 99, 105 (1879) (same).
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act point at which an "idea" is copyrightable as "expression" has
always been problematic,1 particularly in the area of computer
software.2 0 A computer program is a "true hybrid" in terms of
copyright law.21 While it is first created in written form as a series
of commands,22 its practical value lies not in the writing itself, but
in the accomplishment of its intended function.23 One might view
the written form as the "expression" and the functional form as
the "idea," but some courts and commentators have criticized this
approach as too simplistic in the area of computer software. 24
19. See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. de-
nied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931). Judge Learned Hand, a copyright authority, stated:
It is of course essential to any protection of literary property, whether at com-
mon-law or under the statute, that the right cannot be limited literally to the text,
else a plagiarist would escape by immaterial variations. That has never been the
law, but, as soon as literal appropriation ceases to be the test, the whole matter is
necessarily at large, so that, as was recently well said by a distinguished judge, the
decisions cannot help much in a new case .... Nobody has ever been able to fix
that boundary [between "idea" and "expression"], and nobody ever can.
Id.
20. See Gregory J. Maier, Software Protection-Integrating Patent, Copyright and
Trade Secret Law, 69 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOc'Y, 151, 151 (1987). "It is the hybrid
nature of software that causes its failure to fit neatly into any one existing category of intel-
lectual property, resulting in seemingly endless confusion as to how it may best be pro-
tected." Id.
21. Id.
22. See id.
23. See id. at 151. "[F]unctionality... clearly distinguishes [software] from ordinary
writings." Id. See generally Root, supra note 2, at 1266-68 (describing development and
usefulness of operating and application programs).
24. See Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1236 (3d Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987). The court stated that "the purpose or function of
a utilitarian work would be the work's idea, and everything that is not necessary to that
purpose or function would be part of the expression of the idea." Id. The court further
noted that when several ways exist to accomplish a desired result, the particular way se-
lected is not necessary to the result, therefore, it is expression, not idea. Id. Limiting copy-
right protection to a program's literal elements was rejected. Id. at 1238. Further, the court
was unconvinced that development in computer technology was significantly unlike that in
"other areas of science or the arts." Id.
However, the Whelan test for determining copyrightability of computer programs has
been sharply criticized by other courts. See Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 775 F.
Supp. 544, 558 (E.D.N.Y. 1991), aff'd 1992 WL 372273 (2d Cir. 1992). In Altai, the court
found the standard measure, "similarity," totally "inadequate" when applied to computer
programs since they were designed for application to artistic and literary works-not utilita-
rian works. Id. It was this "inadequacy," the court believed, that spurred the Whelan court
"to set forth what now seems to be a simplistic test for similarity between computer pro-
grams." Id. (emphasis added).
Commentators have also criticized the Whelan test. See 3 NimMER & NimMER, supra
note 16, § 13.03[F], at 13-62.34 (1991). "The crucial flaw in ... [the Whelan test] is that it
assumes that only one 'idea,' in copyright law terms,'underlies any computer program, and
1993] 1133
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In a copyright infringement action, a plaintiff must establish
ownership of a valid copyright and that the defendant copied the
copyrighted work.2 5 Copyright ownership is easier to establish than
copying;28 however, a plaintiff may prove copying circumstan-
tially.2 7 In order to do so, a plaintiff must show that the infringing
party had "access" to the program28 and that the infringed work is
"substantially similar" to the copyrighted work.29 If the material
that once a separable idea can be identified, everything else must be expression." Id.; see
also Jack E. Brown, The Current Status of Copyright Protection for Computer Software
and Some Patent Protection Parallels, 6 CoMPUTER L. & PRAC. 170, 172 (1990) (critiquing
Whelan).
25. See, e.g., Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282, 1292
(1991); see also Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1231 (copyright ownership and actual copying must be
shown); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157,
1162 (9th Cir. 1977) (same); Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 90 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976) (same).
26. See 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (1988). Official copyright registration is not required in
order for protection to exist. See id. Registration may occur at "[a]ny time during the sub-
sistence of copyright in any published or unpublished work." Id. A person claiming copy-
right infringement may not, however, initiate an action until such registration has occurred.
Id. at § 411(a) (1988). Registration "constitute[s] prima facie evidence of the validity of the
copyright." Id. § 410(c) (1988) (emphasis added). See generally 3 NiMMER & NIMmER, supra
note 16, § 13.01[A], at 13-4 to 13-8 (discussing copyright ownership).
On the other hand, direct evidence of copying is rarely available. See Whelan, 797 F.2d
at 1231; Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970).
27. See Ferguson v. National Broadcasting Co., 584 F.2d 111, 113 (5th Cir. 1978).
28. See 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 16, § 13.02[A]. Historically, courts have de-
fined "access" as the actual viewing of another's work. See Schwarz v. Universal Pictures
Co., 85 F. Supp. 270, 271 (S.D. Cal. 1945). Recently, courts have broadened this definition to
"merely mean[ ] an opportunity to view the protected material." See Robert R. Jones As-
socs., Inc. v. Nino Homes, 858 F.2d 274, 277 (6th Cir. 1988) (emphasis added).
29. See Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1231-32 (citations omitted); Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc.
v. Altai, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 544, 557 (E.D.N.Y. 1991), aff'd, 1992 WL 372273 (2d Cir. 1992).
The Second Circuit, in Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946), provided a test
to determine if substantial similarity exists:
If there is evidence of access and similarities exist, then the trier of the facts must
determine whether the similarities are sufficient to prove copying. On this issue,
analysis ("dissection") is relevant, and the testimony of experts may be received
to aid the trier of facts ....
If copying is established, then only does there arise the second issue, that of
illicit copying .... On that issue ... the test is the response of the ordinary lay
hearer; accordingly, on that issue, "dissection" and expert testimony are
irrelevant.
Id. at 468.
This is known as the Arnstein bifurcated test. See Root, supra note 2, at 1278-79 n. 99.
The first step, the "extrinsic" test, entails the use of expert testimony to determine whether
the defendant has copied the work. See Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164. The second step, the "in-
trinsic" test, requires the observation of a lay observer to assess whether the two works are
substantially similar. Id. Generally, this test has been used in cases involving materials such
as "novels, plays and paintings." Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1232.
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constitutes an "idea," however, the "substantial similarity" test be-
comes irrelevant because "ideas" are not entitled to copyright
protection."
II. COMPUTER PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT
A computer program is the "set of statements or instructions
to be used directly or indirectly in a computer to bring about a
certain result."31 In order to create a program, a programmer must
work in stages.32 First, the ultimate function or problem to be
solved must be identified.3 3 For example, a programmer may be
asked to create a record-keeping program. Before such a program
can be written, additional background information is needed, such
as order processing, billing procedures, inventory requirements,
and other characteristics of the particular trade.3 4 As this informa-
tion is gathered, the programmer moves into the second phase of
outlining or flowcharting solutions to the problem. 5 Some
flowcharts may represent minute processes that will be incorpo-
rated into the final program. 6 The interaction of the various algo-
rithms37 encompassed in the flowcharts is then analyzed and ar-
The second prong of the Arnstein bifurcated test has been rejected in computer
software cases because the ordinary observer does not have the requisite scientific knowl-
edge to determine how much, if any, of a program has been copied. See Friedman, supra
note 5, at 8. Additionally, the most copyrightable expression, the machine language code, is
"incomprehensible" even to computer experts. Id. at 8-9.
30. See supra note 17 and accompanying text; see also Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback
Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 53 (D. Mass. 1990). Congress has mandated that the courts
create a standard to determine the boundary between "idea" and "expression." See id.; see
also Copyrights On Software, N.Y. Tmas, May 11, 1987, at D2 (noting that infringement
claims decided on whether item in dispute is "idea" or "expression of idea").
31. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
32. See GEMIGNANI, supra note 9, at 80; Menell, supra note 9, at 1051; Friedman,
supra note 5, at 4.
33. See GEMGNANI, supra note 9, at 80; Menell, supra note 9, at 1052.
34. See Menell, supra note 9, at 1052. "[A] major aspect of the task definition process
is understanding the users and determining how best to serve their needs." Id.
35. See Data Cash Sys., Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc., 628 F.2d 1038, 1040 (7th Cir. 1980);
Friedman, supra note 5, at 4. A flowchart itself may be copyrightable depending on its de-
gree of detail. See NIMMR, supra note 9, 1.03[3], at 1-15 to 1-16. While a very simple
flowchart would normally not qualify for copyright protection, a novel and detailed one may
receive protection. Id. at 1-16. Flowchart is defined as "a graphic representation, using sym-
bols interconnected with lines, of the successive steps in a procedure or system." RANDOM
HoUSE DiCToNARY, supra note 17, at 738.
36. See Susan A. Dunn, Note, Defining the Scope of Copyright Protection for Com-
puter Software, 38 STAN. L. REV. 497, 500-01 (1986). In the computer industry, the minute
processes are often called subroutines or modules. Id.
37. The underlying processes used by a program are called algorithms. See Michael S.
Keplinger, Computer Software-Its Nature and Its Protection, 30 EMORY L.J. 484, 484-85
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ranged in the most efficient manner."8 The programmer must then
determine what input is necessary, in what order it should be in-
put, and how it will be combined with other data.39 Finally, the
actual programming begins.40 All steps in the process must be
programmed into a language that the computer can understand,4 1
such as the familiar computer languages FORTRAN42 and BA-
SIC.48 Once written, such programs are in what is referred to as
(1981). An algorithm is the underlying process used by a program and is defined as a "fixed
step-by-step procedure for accomplishing a given result," Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175,
186 n.9 (1981) (citations omitted), or "[a] defined process or set of rules that leads and
assures development of a desired output from a given input," id. Although algorithms must
be developed by humans, computers can execute them faster and more accurately. See Whe-
lan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1229 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 1031 (1987) (citation omitted).
38. See Menell, supra note 9, at 1085. Efficiency relates to fast execution speed, mini-
mal memory utilization and compatibility with data storage devices. Id. "While efficiency
measures may vary across programs depending on the particular programming objectives,
the range of efficiency goals is clear: faster processing speed, good programming practice (as
a means of minimizing debugging problems), efficient memory capacity utilization, and
rapid, accurate information transmission across interfaces." Id. Programs must be efficient
to compete in the marketplace. See Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1230.
39. See Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1230. Such information may be organized in various
ways, some more efficient than others and some more "quirky" than others, all of which
contribute to the desirability of using a program. Id.; see also, JOHN C. LAUTSCH, AMERICAN
STANDARD HANDBOOK OF SOFTWARE LAW § 3.2, at 28 (describing pre-programming analysis).
40. See LAUTSCH, supra note 39, § 3.2, at 28. Writing the software code is easy com-
pared to the preparatory stages of outlining and flowcharting. See Friedman, supra note 5,
at 16. "[A]mong the more significant costs in computer programming are those attributable
to developing the structure and logic of the program." Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1237.
41. See Note, Copyright Protection of Computer Program Code, 96 HARv. L. REV.
1723, 1724-25 (1983). There exists two types of computer language, high level and low level.
Id. Low level language includes "machine language" that is understood by the computer but
not by humans. See infra notes 42-43, 46.
In order for humans to understand program form, high level languages were created.
See Note, supra, at 1725. A "high level" computer language which employs English-like
words is used by the programmer. See M. Margaret McKeown & Gregory J. Wrenn, The
Stakes on Secrecy Are Rising, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 24, 1992, at 27. A second high level language,
"assembly language," which is a series of alpha-numeric labels, is used to translate those
commands into machine understandable code. See Note, supra, at 1725. For purposes of
this Note, the "assembler" step was not presented in the text because it is not relevant to
the analysis.
42. See Note, supra note 41, at 1725. FORTRAN is a "high level programming lan-
guage used mainly for solving problems in science and engineering." RANDOM HOUSE Dic-
TIONARY, supra note 17, at 754. The word "FORTRAN" stands for "formula translation."
See id.
43. See STEVEN J. MANDELL, COMPUTERS AND DATA PROCESSING: CONCEITS AND APPLI-
CATIONS WITH BASIC 257 (2d ed. 1982). BASIC is "a widely adopted programming language
that uses English words, punctuation marks, and algebraic notation to facilitate communica-
tion between the operator or lay user and the computer." RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY, supra
note 17, at 173. "BASIC" is an acronym for "Beginner's All Purpose Symbolic Instruction
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"source code."' 44 The program is then translated into "object code"
or binary code, which is a series of "O"s and "1"s415 that actually
instruct the computer.46
III. JUDICIAL DECISIONS
The difficulty for the courts lies both in determining at what
stage in the development of a computer program an "idea" be-
comes an "expression," and to what extent such expression is enti-
tled to copyright protection.47 The first generation of cases focused
on the literal copying of the program's "source" or "object" code.48
In Stern Electronics, Inc. v. Kaufman,49 the Second Circuit held
that a program's "source code" was copyrightable.50 Subsequently,
in Williams Electronics, Inc. v. Artic International, Inc.,51 the
Third Circuit extended copyright protection to a program's "object
code, 52 holding that such protection was mandated by statute.5 3
Code." See id.
44. See RANDoi HOUSE DicTioNARY, supra note 17, at 173. Source code is a series of
alphanumeric symbols and commands comprising the instructions to the computer as en-
tered by the programmer. Id.; see NIMMER, supra note 9, T 1.03[2], at 1-13. "The source
program may then be transferred to some medium, such as cards or paper tape, for entry
into the computer, or it may be entered directly through a terminal." GEMiGNANI, supra note
9, at 80.
45. See Menell, supra note 9, at 1051 n.27. An assembler or compiler translates the
source code into machine readable "object code." Id.
46. See LAUTSCH, supra note 39, § 3.5, at 35. Source code is not capable of controlling
the computer directly. See NIMMER, supra note 9, T 1.03[2], at 1-13. It must be converted
into electromagnetic impulses that are machine readable. Id.; see also Note, supra note 41,
at 1724-25 (discussing process of code conversion).
47. See GEMIGNANI, supra note 9, at 80-81; see also supra note 17 and accompanying
text.
48. See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1249
(3d Cir. 1983) (stating object code and source code protected from copying by copyright
law), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984); Data Cash Sys., Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc., 628 F.2d
1038, 1040-41 (7th Cir. 1980) (discussing copyright protection of coding in chips). See gener-
ally Menell, supra note 9, at 1073 (discussing first generation cases).
49. 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982).
50. Id. at 855 n.3. "Written computer programs are copyrightable as literary works."
Id. (citation omitted).
51. 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982).
52. Id. at 876-77. The defendant argued that "object code" was not protected because
it could not be understood by human beings. See id.
He argued that a human must comprehend the medium in order for copyright protec-
tion to exist. Id. Citing the Copyright Act, the court rejected this argument stating that
protection extends to any work that "is fixed 'by any method now known or later developed,
and from which work can be perceived... with the aid of a machine or device.'" Id. at 877
(citing 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988)).
53. Williams, 685 F.2d at 873-74; see Stern, 669 F.2d at 855-56; Apple Computer, Inc.
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Both courts reasoned that a program's literal code is entitled to
copyright protection because it is an "'original work[] of author-
ship fixed in a tangible medium.' ,,54 Lower courts as well as other
circuit courts have uniformly embraced the Stern Electronics and
Williams Electronics holdings.55
The second generation of cases involve the more difficult prob-
lem56 of infringement of the "nonliteral" aspects of a computer
program-duplication of a program's organization and structure
without copying the actual source or object code.57 In what is con-
sidered a landmark case, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit, in Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental
Laboratory, Inc.,5  attempted to clarify the distinction between
"idea" and "expression." 59 According to the Whelan court, "the
purpose or function of a utilitarian work would be the work's
idea, and everything that is not necessary to that purpose or
function would be part of the expression of the idea."60 In other
words, if there are a number of alternative ways to perform a par-
ticular function, then each is an "expression.'61 The court further
stated, however, that no protection is afforded to "scenes a
faire,"62 which are "incidents, characters or settings which are as a
practical matter indispensable, or at least standard, in the treat-
ment of a given topic."6 The underlying rationale for the scenes a
faire doctrine is that if only a limited number of ways to express
v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1247 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S.
1033 (1984).
54. Williams, 685 F.2d at 873-74 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988)).
55. See, e.g., Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 888 F.2d 878, 882 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Red
Baron-Franklin Park, Inc. v. Taito Corp., 883 F.2d 275, 278 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 1058 (1990); United States v. O'Reilly, 794 F.2d 613, 614-15 (11th Cir. 1986); M.
Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 434-35 (4th Cir. 1986); Videotronics, Inc. v.
Bend Elecs., 564 F. Supp. 1471, 1477 (D. Nev. 1983); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F.
Supp. 741, 746 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Elcon Indus., Inc. 564 F. Supp. 937,
943 (E.D. Mich. 1982); In re C Tek Software, Inc., 127 B.R. 501, 506 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1991).
56. See Menell, supra note 9, at 1073-74.
57. Id. at 1074.
58. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
59. Id. at 1235-42.
60. Id. at 1236.
61. Id.
62. Id. (citations omitted). Scenes a faire "receive protection only from virtually iden-
tical copying." Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 617
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982); see also Frybarger v. International Business
Machs. Corp., 812 F.2d 525, 530 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting that indispensable expressions re-
ceive protection only from identical copying).
63. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1236 (citation omitted).
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an idea exists, then the "idea" of the work can only be accom-
plished by employing one of these methods;64 thus, copyright pro-
tection would guarantee a virtual monopoly over a particular nec-
essary activity,6 5 contrary to the purposes of copyright law.
Applying this analysis to the facts of its case, the Whelan
court found that "the structure of the program was not essential to
[the] task" performed and, therefore, was an "expression," entitled
to copyright protection. In reaching its decision, the Third Cir-
cuit adopted the district court's definition of "expression:" "The
'expression of an idea' in a software computer program is the man-
ner in which the program operates, controls and regulates the com-
puter in receiving, assembling, calculating, retaining, correlating,
and producing useful information either on a screen, print-out or
by audio communication. 6 7
This definition has led to inconsistent decisions among lower
courts because some have interpreted it to afford extremely broad
protection and others very limited protection. 8 Moreover, the
other circuit courts have not uniformly embraced the Whelan
test.6 9
In Plains Cotton Cooperative, Association v. Goodpasture
Computer Service, Inc.,70 the Fifth Circuit rejected Whelan stating
that copyright protection should not extend to the structure of a
computer program because the structure represents "ideas" rather
than "expression. 7 1 However, a closer examination of the Plains
64. See id.; Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 430, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 1985),
aff'd, 784 F.2d 44 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159 (1986); see also Narell v. Freeman,
872 F.2d 907, 911 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating that ordinary phrases not entitled to copyright
protection); Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 888 F.2d 878, 886 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (explaining that
scenes a faire refer to stereotyped expressions).
65. See Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d 485, 489 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984).
66. See Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1238-39. "[There are other programs on the market...
that perform the same functions but have different structures and designs." Id. at 1238.
67. Id. at 1239 (citing Whelan, 609 F. Supp. at 1320).
68. Compare Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127,
1135 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (giving copyright protection to menu screens, input formats, and
screen sequencing), with Digital Communications Assocs., Inc. v. Softklone Distrib. Corp.,
659 F. Supp. 449, 455 (N.D. Ga. 1987) (refusing to extend copyright protection to screen
displays generated by program), and Manufacturers Technologies, Inc. v. CAMS, Inc., 706
F. Supp. 984, 994-95 (D. Conn. 1989) (same).
69. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
70. 807 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 821 (1987).
71. Id. at 1262. Citing Judge Higginbotham's opinion in Synercom Technology, Inc. v.
University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1978), the Plains Cotton court
stated that a computer program's "input formats" were ideas, not expressions, and were not
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Cotton decision reveals that it is actually reconcilable with Whe-
lan. In Plains Cotton, the court determined that the structure of
the program was dictated by the "externalities of the market, 7
2
implying that the "idea" was only expressible in a limited number
of ways.7 The structure of the program may therefore be seen as a
"necessary incident," or scenes a faire, which is not an "expres-
sion," but merely an uncopyrightable "idea. '74 It is submitted that
this conclusion is entirely consistent with the Whelan rule that
when a computer program can be structured in several different
ways to accomplish the same result, it is protected by copyright
law.7 5
IV. THE COMPUTER ASSOCIATES TEST
A more recent attack on Whelan was launched in Computer
Associates International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., e in which the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the Whelan test, calling it
"flawed," "inadequate," and "outdated. 7 7 In addition to stating
that the Whelan approach "relies too heavily on metaphysical dis-
tinctions and does not place enough emphasis on practical consid-
erations, 7 8 the court presented an alternative approach for deter-
mining computer software copyright infringement cases.7 9
Borrowing from familiar copyright doctrines, the Second Circuit
created a three-step test,80 which, in essence, seems to merge the
test for distinguishing between idea and expression with a method
for ascertaining the "substantial similarity" of two computer pro-
entitled to copyright protection. Id. (citation omitted).
72. Plains Cotton, 807 F.2d at 1262. "The record supports the inference that market
factors play a significant role in determining the sequence and organization of cotton mar-
keting software, and we decline to hold that those patterns cannot constitute 'ideas' in a
computer context." Id.; see supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
.73. See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Nos. 762, 91-7893, 91-7935, 1992 WL 372273 (2d Cir. June 22, 1992).
77. Id. at *12. Judge Pratt, sitting by designation in the district court, also called the
Whelan test "simplistic," "inadequate," and "inaccurate." See Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc.
v. Altai, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 544, 558-59 (E.D.N.Y. 1991), aff'd, 1992 WL 372273 (2d Cir.
1992); Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, Whelan Standards Attacked, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 14,
1992, at 3.
78. Computer Assocs., 1992 WL 372273, at *13.
79. Id. at *12-*20.
80. Id. at *12. The Second Circuit also cautioned other courts not to apply the test
strictly in all circumstances. Id. If necessary, other courts should use a modified version of
the test presented. Id.
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grams. Step one of the test, referred to as the "abstractions test,"81
is used to determine which portions of the plaintiff's program are
copyrightable expressions. The "abstractions test," as first enunci-
ated by Judge Learned Hand, provides:
Upon any work.., a great number of patterns of increasing gen-
erality will fit equally well, as more and more of the incident is
left out. The last may perhaps be no more than the most general
statement of what the [work] is about and at times might consist
only of its title; but there is a point in this series of abstractions
where they are no longer protected, since otherwise the [author]
could prevent the use of his "ideas" to which, apart from their
expression, his property is never extended . 2
The Second Circuit stated that, in the computer software con-
text, this "abstractions test" would require a court to "dissect the
allegedly copied program's structure and isolate each... abstrac-
tion contained within it." 8 For example, in the steps outlined in
Part II of this Note, a court would analyze isolated steps of a pro-
gram in reverse developmental order. 4 Possible abstractions would
be the "object code," followed by the "source code," then the input
formats, then the flowcharts or outlines, and finally the problem to
be solved.8 5
The second step is a "successive filtering method" that re-
quires the court to screen a program's "components at each level of
abstraction" to determine copyrightability of these components."
In so doing, a court must determine whether the inclusion of each
component "was 'idea' or was dictated by considerations of effi-
ciency, so as to be necessarily incidental to that idea; required by
factors external to the program itself; or taken from the public do-
main and hence not protectable expression. "87 With this second
step, the Computer Associates court reaffirmed the principle that
81. Id. at *12-*13.
82. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied,
282 U.S. 902 (1931), quoted in Computer Assocs., 775 F. Supp. at 560. The court, in Com-
puter Associates, followed Professor Nimmer's suggestion that the abstractions test was the
best method of determining substantial similarities in computer programs. Id. The Second
Circuit was in "substantial agreement" with the district court's reasoning. Computer As-
socs., 1992 WL 372273, at *1.
83. Computer Assocs., 1992 WL 372273, at *13.
84. Id.; see supra notes 31-46 and accompanying text.
85. See supra notes 31-46 and accompanying text.
86. Computer Associates, 1992 WL 372273, at *14-*17.
87. Id. at *14-*17.
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scenes a faire, necessary incidents, and items in the public domain
are not granted copyright protection."" Based on this approach,
copyright protection would not be available for a computer pro-
gram that is composed of existing techniques, even though taken
as a whole the program may be novel.8 9
The third step is "comparison." 90 Once a court eliminates the
unprotectable components through the filtration process, "a core of
protectable expression" remains.91 These "golden nuggets" are re-
viewed to determine whether "the defendant copied any aspect of
this [remaining] protected expression," and to assess "the copied
portion's relative importance with respect to the plaintiff's overall
program."92
It is submitted that although the court attempted to provide a
"pragmatic" analysis, it failed to establish a truly useful approach,
and instead placed additional unnecessary burdens on the lower
courts. First, the filtration method proposed by the court requires
the reverse engineering of a plaintiff's program.9 3 This will necessa-
rily increase the costs and time involved in software copyright liti-
gation because experts must be employed to review the subject
programs. The possibility of prohibitive legal and expert costs will
likely result in foregone lawsuit opportunities, even though plain-
tiffs may have valid claims. Second, it is often unclear what is in
the public domain and what is not, particularly in the dynamic
field of computer software. 4 Therefore, a court may require addi-
tional expert advice to make such a determination, or it may even
make a decision relying on mere speculation. In either case, consis-
tency is unlikely. Finally, requiring courts to evaluate the relative
importance of the copied portion of a program with the overall
program places too much discretion with the court and will ulti-
mately lead to further inconsistent decision-making. This will leave
programmers uncertain as to which components of a program they
88. Id.
89. See Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, Copyright Protection for Software Rede-
fined, N.Y.L.J., Jul. 14, 1992, at 3, 7.
90. Computer Assocs., 1992 WL 372273, at *18.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at *13. The court must examine the program "in a manner that resembles re-
verse engineering." Id.
94. See, e.g., Bill Machrone, Roots: The Evolution of Innovation, P.C. MAGAZIE, May
26, 1987, at 166, 169 (discussing the keystroke sequence of WordStar and how it became
public domain).
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are entitled to duplicate and which they are not.9 5 It is submitted,
therefore, that in its attempt to restrict copyright protection for
computer software, the Second Circuit failed to confine copyright
protection to the appropriate extent.
V. A PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
By providing a system of incentives, copyright protection" al-
lows individual authors and developers to capitalize upon their cre-
ative labor.9 7 The ultimate goal of copyright law, however, is to rec-
ognize and serve the public interest. 8 Indeed, Congress provides
copyright protection "to serve the public welfare by encouraging
authors to generate new ideas and disclose them to the public, be-
ing free to do so in any uniquely expressed way they may
choose." 9 In defining copyright laws, Congress has the difficult
task of balancing the interests of authors and developers without
95. See Jim Seymour, Who Owns the Standards?, P.C. MAGAZINE, May 26, 1987, at
174, 176. "In the meantime, software developers will have to consult a lawyer when design-
ing their [programs]." Id.
96. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 52-53 (D. Mass.
1990). "The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents
and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is
the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors." Mazer
v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954); see also United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334
U.S. 131, 158 (1948) (noting that reward to authors is inducement for them to release cre-
ated products to the public), aff'd, 339 U.S. 974 (1950).
97. See Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932).
The production to which the protection of copyright may be accorded is the prop-
erty of the author and not of the United States.... [The copyright] confers upon
the author after publication the exclusive right for a limited period to multiply
and vend [the creation] and to engage in the other activities described by the
statute in relation to the subject matter.... In creating this right, the Congress
did not reserve to the United States any interest in the production itself, or in the
copyright, or in the profits that may be derived from its use.... The owner of the
copyright, if he pleases, may refrain from vending or licensing and content himself
with simply exercising the right to exclude others from using his property.
Id. (citations omitted).
98. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984); Para-
mount Pictures, 334 U.S. at 158; Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 52-53.
The private reward to the author is not the goal of copyright law, it is merely an incen-
tive, chosen by Congress, to achieve "the ultimate goal of copyright law-the advancement
of public welfare." Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 53. "The immediate effect of our copyright law is
to secure a fair return for an 'author's' creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incen-
tive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good." Sony, 464 U.S. at 432 (cita-
tions omitted).
99. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 52 (citing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters.,
471 U.S. 539 (1985)).
1993] 1143
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
diminishing the free flow of ideas and information.1 e0 The Supreme
Court has recognized this balancing effort, but has emphasized
that, in deciding copyright cases, the policy of serving the public
interest predominates. 10
It is proposed that a program's "expression" should be limited
to the literal elements of "source" and "object" codes, thereby pro-
viding a clear, predictable test for copyright infringement of
software. Application of the existing tests may lead to overprotec-
tion to the detriment of innovation and public benefit. 0 2 In the
software industry, computer programs are built on pre-existing
knowledge; 0 3 thus, improvements are incremental and founded on
minor modifications to proven techniques. 04 Because the broad
100. See supra notes 11-13.
101. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 429 (citing Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. at 158).
102. See Root, supra note 2, at 1293. "Computer programs are fundamentally differ-
ent from most other literary works that produce technological growth in that the program
itself both expresses the innovation and performs the new operation." Id. at 1292. In creat-
ing a program, a programmer must first recreate a copyrighted program's procedure if he is
going to improve upon it. Id. at 1292-93. If broad protection is enforced a programmer will
not be allowed to use existing knowledge and technology. Id. Providing such protection will
create "strong monopolies" to those who first write programs, thereby "inhibit[ing] other
creators from developing improved products." Menell, supra note 9, at 1047-48.
In addition, the user group will be less likely to purchase programs that require new
training when they are familiar with existing programs. See Synercom Technology, Inc. v.
University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003, 1013 (N.D. Tex. 1978); Friedman, supra note
5, at 17. This is particularly true in the user interface area. See Synercom, 462 F. Supp. at
1013. In Synercom, the court emphasized the public benefit of allowing the use of a pre-
existing "figure-H" automobile gear shift pattern. Id. Although the pattern was arbitrarily
chosen, and could have been expressed in several other ways, the court found that uniform
use of such a pattern was "socially desirable." Id. Such uniformity, contrasted with the
ongoing creation of new patterns, avoids otherwise extensive and expensive training. Id. In
applying this analogy to computer programs, the court said, "[a]dmittedly, there are many
more possible choices of computer formats, and the decision among them more arbitrary,..
. [however] Synercom's argument that the order and sequence of data was the expression,
not the idea, has been rejected." Id. (footnote omitted); see also Patricia Keefe, Software
Copyright a Mixed Bag, COMPUTERWORLD, Feb. 12, 1990, at 35, 40 (user group seeks some
level of compatibility among software packages, which would be threatened by broad copy-
right protection); Friedman, supra note 5, at 17 (potential user unlikely to purchase new
software product if not compatible with market leader).
103. See Root, supra note 2, at 1291-92. Programmers are generally familiar with the
function and design of the competitors' programs. See 3 NiMMER & NiMMER, supra note 16,
§ 13.03[F], at 13-.26 -.27. "User attachment to the particular way a popular program func-
tions has spawned a segment of the software industry devoted almost exclusively to 'cloning'
existing programs - independently producing less expensive look-alike and work-alike ver-
sions of popular programs." Id. at 13-78.27 n.272.
104. See Friedman, supra note 5, at 17; see also Affiliated Hosp. Prods., Inc. v. Merdel
Game Mfg. Co., 513 F.2d 1183, 1188 (2d Cir. 1975) (copyright infringement not found where
"good faith attempt" to incrementally improve on existing knowledge).
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protection granted under the existing tests will foreclose a great
deal of this "cumulative innovation," 105 the "stepping stone" inno-
vation process, which is unique to the industry, will be less likely
to proceed. 106 Consequently, such broad protection will force pro-
grammers to "start from scratch" every time an innovative pro-
gram is considered, 107 a result antithetical to the very goal of the
copyright laws. 0 8
Additionally, since computer technology is one of the most
rapidly changing and developing industries,109 current innovations
may be obsolete in twelve months.110 In order for a programmer to
copy another program's structure, considerable time and effort will
be expended emulating the "ideas" behind the program.1 As the
There are innumerable programs available that are based on improvements to existing
products. See, Machrone, supra note 94, at 166. "Users would be far worse off if they had to
wait for conceptual breakthroughs or new paradigms instead of refinement." Id. Advance-
ment that comes about through evolution, rather than revolution, should not be protected,
and if such protection exists, the public will ultimately lose. Id. at 168.
105. See Root, supra note 2, at 1293. "[F]ew programmers have the capability to cre-
ate totally new methods of operations, [however], there are many programmers who can
mimic the pioneers and add improvements." Id. The costs to software developers may be
prohibitive if they must consult an attorney every time they consider creating a new pro-
gram. See Seymour, supra note 95, at 174, 176; see also Victoria Slind-Flor, Lawyers, Pro-
grammers Interface, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 16, 1992, at 3, 12 (stating that fear of cost of defend-
ing infringement suits chills programmer creativity); Paul Freiberger, For This Suit, You
Need a Program, NEWSDAY, Feb. 18, 1992, at 27 (noting that lawsuits could prevent compa-
nies from developing applications programs).
106. See Root, supra note 2, at 1293. Every time a programmer intended to create a
program, he would have to "reinvent the wheel." Id.; see also Machrone, supra note 94, at
168 (explaining that interfaces created through evolution belong in public domain and
should not be protected).
107. See Friedman, supra note 5, at 17. "A programmer should ... be free to study a
piece of software and to incorporate any ideas he may glean from normal usage into his own
work." Id. at 16. According to a 1989 survey, 80% of approximately 700 software developers
were against infringement suits because of their negative impact on the industry. See Keefe,
supra note 102, at 40.
108. See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text (discussing public policies under-
lying copyright law).
109. See supra notes 1, 3 (discussing computer statistics).
110. See Robert N. Noyce, Microelectronics, 237 Sci. AM. 62, 68 (1977). "A year's ad-
vantage in introducing a new product or new process can give a company a 25% cost advan-
tage over competing companies; conversely, a year's lag puts a company at a significant
disadvantage with respect to its competitors." Id.
111. See James Chesser, Note, Semiconductor Chip Protection: Changing Roles for
Copyright and Competition, 71 VA. L. REV. 249, 287-88 (1985).
Without Protection. . . there remains much financial incentive to innovate.
The lead-time gained by an innovator who is first to market a good product, cre-
ates special profits. Indeed, those who are first enjoy a form of product monopoly
that lasts until they are copied. Moreover, copying is seldom immediate; generally,
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Whelan court noted, "[o]ne cannot simply 'approximate' the entire
copyrighted computer program and create a similar operative pro-
gram without the expenditure of almost the same amount of time
as the original programmer expended." '112 Thus, by the time a pro-
gram's ideas are copied, reprogrammed, and manifested in a new
form, it would already be obsolete because superior versions of ex-
isting programs will already be available. 113 Obviously, it is unrea-
sonable for a programmer to engage in such a fruitless activity. In-
stead, it would be more practical for a programmer to innovate and
build on the existing technology." 4
CONCLUSION
Limiting protection to the literal aspects of software would al-
low developers to reap the rewards of their creations and would
provide an incentive for programmers to improve existing products
or develop new programs in order to stay ahead of the competition.
Society would thus benefit because competition would ensure con-
tinued technological growth in the computer software industry and
the availability of the best possible software products. In addition,
literal protection would provide a legal analysis that is both coher-
ent and predictable. This results in more certainty not only for the
courts, but also for the software industry and society as a whole.
Martin T. Hillery
the more sophisticated or involved a... design is, the longer it will take to copy.
More fundamentally, it is competition that provides much of the impetus behind
innovation.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also supra note 102 and accompanying text.
112. Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., 797 F.2d 1222, 1237 (3d Cir. 1986)
(citation omitted), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
113. See supra note 110.
114. See Friedman, supra note 5, at 17.
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